THE New Republic

When Rule XXII Swallowed Itself

Richard Neuberger

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Page 5

The Decade Ahead

A SYMPOSIUM ON THE WORLD OF 1957-1967

Joseph C. Harsch *Hugh Massingham* *Andre Philip*
Hans J. Morgenthau *Richard Lowenthal*

REVIEWS

Violence and the Mass Media

Wilson the President

Tales of Rabbi Nachman

JANUARY 14, 1957 20c

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Washington Wire

Ike to the Rescue

ONCE Sir Galahad rode out to rescue a dozen Virgins menaced by a Dragon. A couple of Round Table knights, Sir Boris of Britain and Sir Dennis of France, had undertaken the job but had not behaved very well. "Be of good cheer," cried Sir Galahad glowingly. "I have arrived. Your virginity is safe."

"Don't want to be safe; ain't sure we want to be Virgins!" came the disconcerting reply, accompanied by a horrid leer. You can imagine how shocked Sir Galahad felt.

"Where were *you* when the Dragon first arrived—?" asked one Virgin.

"We *like* Dragons," cooed another Virgin who was particularly bold with a bare midriff.

The big white charger looked around inquiringly at Sir Galahad after a while. . . . But the blushing knight seemed uncertain what to do next.

Moral! Before you undertake a rescue mission make sure of your Virgins.

We watched the President undertake his rescue mission last Saturday in Congress. The news of the "Eisenhower Doctrine" was not put out in the ordinary way. It was leaked out the week before over a period of three days to a small group of selected reporters. It was all in the papers before the President told Congress.

Well, it was a fine show as the joint session crowd arrived. The girl reporter beside us loved Mrs. Eisenhower's mink stole. Mrs. Nixon next to her wore an attractive cloth coat.

"Isn't it tactful the way Pat always under-dresses Mamie?" asked the enraptured girl reporter.

We never saw such a big turnout of diplomats. And the Supreme Court Justices after a decade of informality all had their nice dark robes on again, looking like white-haired gentlemen in black raincoats.

The applause for the President was universal. Looking down on the great hall as he entered, we noted the white hands all fluttering at once, like palpitating wings of butterflies. There was an undercurrent of cheers. The President spoke quietly and effectively.

The fact is, nobody is very happy. How do you safeguard reluctant virgins? Democrats are notably skeptical. The evening before at a local party rally Dean Acheson had summed up the new "doctrine" as "fighting an enemy who isn't going to attack, with forces that don't exist, to support a policy you haven't decided upon." That may be. But Democrats can't help asking how America got into this mess. How long are we going to snoot Britain? Where was the Eisenhower Doctrine when euphoric Dulles was assuring the nation that things never looked so bright?

Eisenhower has plenty of Constitutional authority to act in the Middle East by himself if he wants to. Advance Congressional approval will strengthen his hand, but to have much meaning it should come fast and overwhelmingly. There certainly was no rush to sign a blank check as Eisenhower walked beamingly down and out of the big House of Representatives chamber with the audience standing and still applauding.

Back to '49!

The Senate, 55 to 38, last Friday rejected the liberals' drive against filibusters. We always get a thrill out of a Senate vote. "The clerk will call the roll!" says the Vice President—the most electrifying phrase in Congress. "Mister Aiken," intones the clerk. Galleries freeze. A bell rings off behind the glass swinging doors. Reporters grab the yard-long list of names, printed on stiff paper with blank "Yea" and "Nay" columns. Outside the great building, lights twinkle and the Capitol dome glows in the night. Inside in the gentleman's club, it is cozy and familiar and suddenly electric.

Well, the liberals got licked as they knew they would. But curiously enough it was rather encouraging. On the same try in 1953 they got only 21 votes. This time there were almost twice as many. Then again, the adaptable Nixon publicly advised the Senate he thought one section of Rule 22 (the filibuster rule) is unconstitutional. His opinion wasn't binding, but it showed which side the adept Vice President thinks his bread is buttered on. Finally, there was Nixon's fellow-Californian — Minority Leader Knowland (also believed to be running hard for the Presidency). He is heavier and less agile than Nixon and turns more slowly. He voted with the conservative majority. But even he showed the effect of gathering forces. The Senate is a "continuing body" he argued (contrary to Nixon), but it is possible to change individual rules by a little prying and prodding. In fact he pledged to offer important modifications of bad old Rule 22 himself. If adopted these would knock off a special group of fetters added in 1949.

Nobody can quite believe this will happen. But enough momentum is being generated to give vast encouragement to some observers and to prove that the bold, militant action taken by half a dozen brave men right at the start of the session was worth while. "With a little more progress we will be back where we were in 1949!" joked one of them happily.

In the Wind

ONE CAN pooh-pooh these gains. But the fact is there are odd new winds blowing in the capital. The Democrats are divided, but the past week showed that the "national" wing of the party is not going to bow down after all to the Southern minority segregationists. Congressional leaders Johnson and Rayburn wouldn't sit on the new National Committee's new Advisory group, but it is going ahead just the same with Truman and Stevenson on it and Mrs. Roosevelt affiliated to it. The thing isn't dead at all. It didn't die because it is essential for the Democratic governors, mayors and leaders outside of the South to have a forum that identifies them as separate from the Eastlands of the Congressional Dixiecrat group. In a polite but unmistakable first statement the Advisory Committee told the Party leadership in Congress that it wanted a little more militancy, please.

Yes, a new breeze whispers in the capital. It is still close and oppressive but now the air moves a bit. It is hard to measure the breeze. But we think George Norris and old Bob LaFollette could have named it. **T.R.B.**

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The New Republic
A JOURNAL OF OPINION

JANUARY 14, 1957

THE WEEK 3

Eisenhower Doctrine; Who Makes China Policy?
When Rule XXII Swallowed Itself! by Richard Neuberger

THE DECADE AHEAD 6

A Symposium on the World of 1957-67 by Richard Lowenthal, Andre Philip, Serge de Gunzburg, Joseph C. Harsch, Hugh Massingham, Irving Kristol, Michael Lindsay and Hans J. Morgenthau

BOOKS AND COMMENT 19

Reviews: The Circle of Guilt; Wilson; Tales of Rabbi Nachman Gullible Humanity, by Maxwell Geismar

VOL. 136, NO. 2, ISSUE 2198

Correspondence

► ***The Foreign Policy Debate***

SIRS:

THE series of articles by Hans J. Morgenthau (*NR*, December 10, 17) and the replies they have provoked make not only interesting reading but constitute a real contribution to current discussion of foreign policies. In the absence of any real debate at the governmental level of these vital issues of international relations it is imperative that independent periodicals like *The New Republic* supply this need . . .

Since the rumored conversation in 1947 between Senator Vandenberg and President Truman to the effect that the Congress would supply adequate funds for Communist-containment—the Truman Doctrine—only if the President would scare the "daylights" out of the American people, there has been little, if any, independent and objective debate

(*Continued on page 23*)

Eisenhower Doctrine

THE "Eisenhower Doctrine" should be welcomed for what it is: a beginning in the evolution of a Middle East policy.

The time has come for the President's critics to end their indictment of past equivocation, valid though the charge was. Let them point the way for future action, since the President himself has indicated that further developments are to be expected.

The ballyhoo which preceded the President's appearance before the Congress on January 5 overstated the scope of the new policy. Overt Russian aggression in the area has not been a serious possibility in recent months, and the President's policy would offer no solution to a situation in which Russian volunteers were sent to Egypt at Egypt's request. Nevertheless, the military warning voiced by the President can be commended as a restraining influence upon rash military actions.

But the primary threat to the independence of the Middle East is from Communist non-military penetration "to bring under their domination peoples now free and independent . . . by threat of military action, use of economic pressure, internal subversion, or other means." And at this point the President's statement becomes vague. His only proposal is to add $200 million a year to the present US economic-aid program of about $50 million in the Middle East. This invites the same wishful thinking which followed the Arab-Israeli Armistice of 1949 and led to the past eight years of drift. The proposal rests on the notion that if Arabs are offered enough money they will absorb themselves in economic development and make peace. This did not work in 1949 for several reasons. First, the unsolved Palestine question produced swollen arms budgets, which now consume more than a quarter of Arab revenues, thus preempting the savings which should be available for development. Next, the hysterical nationalism which mounted during the lingering truce proved a favorable climate for the rise of demagogues who, once in office, maintained their positions through anti-Jewish appeals. When these demagogues appealed to the Russians for arms, they used the unsolved Palestine issue as their justification. Peace was not obtained then merely by offering development funds. And raising the number of dollars now will not significantly improve the prospect.

Clearly a program to stop Soviet penetration must start with the political issues which have made the Russians welcome in the area, namely, the Suez crisis and the Arab-Israeli feud, which the President chose not to discuss in his January 5 appeal. And there are constructive steps which the US can propose to the current UN Assembly which would give the President's offer of economic assistance a better chance for success.

The US can recommend to the UN Assembly that it create a demili-

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tarized zone running the entire length of the Israel-Egypt border, taking in the Gaza Strip as its western anchor on the Mediterranean, and the Egyptian shoreline of the Gulf of Aqaba on the east. Such a plan would place UN patrols at all disputed points between the two nations, and reopen the Gulf to Israeli shipping.

Second, the US can recommend that the General Assembly instruct the Secretary General to resume the Suez negotiations, and if agreement is not reached before the Canal is reopened, an emergency session of the UN General Assembly can be called to consider an imposed settlement.

Third, the US can urge that the Assembly direct the Secretary General to hold private talks with Arabs and Israelis, in order to narrow the issues, and bring about face-to-face negotiations before the regular UN Assembly meeting next October. Both Arabs and Jews have justifiable grievances that must be accommodated, and both must make concessions. If these talks fail, let the Assembly then draw up a minimum live-and-let-live arrangement, which includes solutions for refugees, boycotts, blockades, and border raids, to be imposed by the Assembly on pain of UN sanctions.

Who Makes China Policy?

THE MAN most responsible for the State Department's militant insistence on keeping US newsmen out of China happens to be Chiang's staunchest advocate in administration councils, Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. If one begins with Robertson's assumption that present US China policy is the very shield of the Republic—a settled, never-to-be-altered fact—then it may seem perfectly defensible to rough up a defiant newsman as Robertson has done. But just who is an Assistant Secretary of State to make such long-term assumptions in behalf of United States public opinion?

True, the Department has justified the apparent forcing of *Look's* Edmund Stevens to quit China as a bargaining point for the release of the 10 US prisoners held as political hostages. But not far back in the Department's mind lies the more pervasive worry that the basic premises of its Far Eastern policy may be endangered. Once US newsmen get an official blessing to go to China, missionaries and businessmen are sure to argue that their cases are quite as special—and once journalists, missionaries and businessmen are all roaming the Chinese mainland, it will soon be respectable to talk of lifting the trade embargo, of United Nations entry, and finally of United States recognition.

Here the issue is not whether US China policy should be revised. Rather it is the summary manner in which the State Department has arrogated that decision to itself in revoking the passports of Stevens, his photographer Philip Harrington, and William Worthy of the *Baltimore Afro-American*.

By right the decision belongs to United States public opinion. Since the Peking regime first invited independent US newsmen to visit China last August, the US public has had every right to get first-hand reports and on the basis of them to appraise government policy. It was one thing for the Department to appeal to the press not to accept the Communist invitations for the sake of the prisoners. But when a break in the ranks did occur, it was not for a democratic government to dictate the limits within which a free press could operate. We agree with *Editor and Publisher* that US reporters should not be "subject to control by our government according to what the foreign policy might be at any given moment . . . pawns of our government's foreign policy."

EDITOR Cliff McKay of the *Afro-American* newspapers has given us an idea how baldly Secretary Robertson has sought to exercise his "control."

He tells us that when he met with Robertson at the Secretary's invitation,

> he told me he didn't have the confidence in Worthy's objectivity that I seemed to have. I asked him, "Are you saying he's a Communist?" He got fussed about that and said "No." But that was what it amounted to, wasn't it? He was implying he wasn't loyal to America. He admitted he had never even met Bill Worthy.

Secretary Robertson seems to us the one whose objectivity is open to question, and we can only wonder why a man with such rigid pro-Chiang views should be in a position to insulate the American public from knowledge of the area which experts in this issue's symposium agree will be the greatest challenge to the policy of the United States in the decade ahead.

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When Rule XXII Swallowed Itself!

The following is a chapter from Professor Ludwig Nuclear's authoritative college textbook, History of the United States During the Unprecedented 1950's.

CONFUSION gripped America after the Senate had decided that the blessings of Rule XXII should not be confined to the Senate exclusively, but ought to be extended to the country as a whole. This was the cherished Senate rule under which debate never could be ended unless two-thirds of all the members of the Senate decided the time had come to do so. "Why make ourselves the sole beneficiaries of so splendid a policy?" Senators had asked. And so Rule XXII had been applied to every election for federal office as well as to Senate rollcalls.

The first national uncertainty arose after the 34th President of the United States, a former General of the Army named Dwight D. Eisenhower, had failed to poll the votes of two-thirds of all the eligible voters on his first try for reelection.

President Eisenhower's vote in all 48 states was 35,582,236. His Democratic opponent, Adlai E. Stevenson, polled 26,027,887 votes. It looked as if the President had been returned to office. However, the Bureau of the Census announced that there had been 102,743,000 eligible voters at the time of the 1956 election. This meant that Mr. Eisenhower would have had to poll 68,494,000 votes to satisfy the requirements of Rule XXII.

The chairman of the Republican National Committee, jolted to learn that Mr. Eisenhower had fallen a staggering 33 million votes short of reelection, conferred frantically with GOP leaders on Capitol Hill concerning the immediate repeal of Rule XXII. They warned him that a two-thirds vote of all members of the Senate never could be mustered for repeal prior to January 20, 1957, when Mr. Eisenhower's first term in office would expire. The sole possible solution seemed to be the holding of another national election at once, which was set for December 6, 1956. Republican precinct squads, using mastiffs and police dogs, went into remote slums and backwoods solitudes to flush out all voters and escort them to the polls. They had discovered that, under Rule XXII, an absent voter was automatically a "no" voter.

Yet all the aggressive efforts of the GOP were in vain. Adlai Stevenson, one of the most eloquent orators of his era, decided that the unlimited-debate provisions of Rule XXII afforded him a far greater opportunity for exhaustive discussion of all issues than a December 6 election deadline allowed. Therefore, Mr. Stevenson announced that he was not ready to vote; he went right on talking.

In desperation, the Republican Attorney General sent his Solicitor to appeal to the Supreme Court, but Rule XXII evidently applied here, too. The Chief Justice was unable to convince two-thirds of his colleagues that the election ought to be held on December 6, regardless of Mr. Stevenson's desire to debate beyond that time. In fact, at least one-third of the members of the court declined to stop talking long enough for the Chief Justice to ask them to decide whether Mr. Stevenson could be compelled to stop talking long enough for the country to go to the polls.

Just when the governmental processes seemed totally snarled, an obscure young lawyer in Pendleton, Oregon, wrote a letter to the Sunday edition of the *New York Times*, pointing out that the very Senate which had fastened Rule XXII upon the nation was itself in serious violation of Rule XXII.

He went down the long list of states to show that scarcely a Senator had received the vote of two-thirds of the eligible citizens in his constituency. One Senator from a state where cotton and peanuts comprise leading crops was shown to have polled barely one-fifth of the qualified votes in his state. A predominant reason for this, according to the letter to the *Times*, appeared to have been that nearly all the citizens of colored skin never even bothered to show up at the ballot box.

"And so," concluded this historic communication to the *Times*, "Rule XXII actually has worked to render illegal, under Rule XXII, many of those Senators who were instrumental in making Rule XXII the law of the land."

At this point, with the Senate itself apparently in some danger of being declared null and void, the controversial provision was abruptly repealed. Hardly anybody knows precisely when this took place. It allegedly was done by voice vote late in the evening, with only two Senators, five pageboys and one Capitol policeman on the floor of the Senate.

IN THE new rules later adopted, a mysterious gap appeared between Rule XXI and Rule XXIII. Senators were said to be reluctant even to refer to any provision as Rule XXII. It was omitted like the 13th floor of some office buildings. No Rule XXII ever has been enacted since that era, although the United States is now one of the oldest of the earth's existing nations.

RICHARD L. NEUBERGER

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THE DECADE AHEAD

A Symposium on the World of 1957-1967





TWO AND A HALF months ago, Walter Lippmann offered some provocative views on the decade that has just begun. "We are living," he wrote, "in great days, for we are witnessing the dissolution of the international structure of the postwar world. The armistices of World War II, which have never become a peace settlement, left the world with two great centers of power—the one in Moscow and the other in Washington. The armistice lines of 1945, excepting only China, became the political and ideological frontiers of the two worlds, and behind them two great coalitions were organized. This postwar structure has been breaking down on both sides of the dividing line, and in the past two years at a rapidly rising tempo. We have become increasingly aware that the power and influence of the Western nations are declining. Now we are seeing the same essential process inside the Soviet orbit. The breakup of any order, even so obviously provisional an order as that of the postwar era, is bound to mean widespread disorder—as witness the disorders in Hungary, in Algeria, in Cyprus and in Palestine and in Singapore.

"What we must do is to keep in mind, a good part of the time no doubt in the back of our minds, the central idea that an order of things is dissolving and that a new order to follow it is now waiting to be conceived, and then brought into being."

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The editors of *The New Republic* have invited and here publish comment on some of the implications which might be drawn from Mr. Lippmann's thesis.

★

Can There Be Real Peace In a Two-Power World?

by RICHARD LOWENTHAL

I BELIEVE the world of the next decade will still be essentially a two-power world, *i.e.*, it will contain only two powers able to provide their own defense for all eventualities and to maintain their economies on a modern industrial level, independent of international changes, by their own unaided efforts. Possession of the H-bomb is a symbol rather than the root cause of this pre-eminent position of the US and the USSR as the only two truly sovereign states in the world; its production by Britain will not change that situation, nor will any degree of industrial progress by China that is possible within a decade.

Continued existence of two super-powers means a continued tendency for the rest of the world to be "polarized" around them, especially so long as Russia is governed by a totalitarian Communist regime founded on ultimately irreconcilable hostility to the non-Communist world. But the way in which their influence affects all other states, the degree of independence possible, and hence the scope both for conflict among secondary and minor powers and for conscious international efforts to deal with such conflicts, are likely to change greatly. Some of the directions of that change can now be foreseen with a reasonable degree of probability.

In the first place, there is now a real chance that the crisis of the Communist ideology, caused by the destruction of the Stalin myth and the revolutions within the Soviet empire, may lead to the disintegration of the Communist Party regime within the Soviet Union itself and thus to the end of the totalitarian age at least for Europe. I do not believe that such a historic transformation can be achieved by a kind of gradual "mellowing" of the regime; rather would I expect it to come about through a series of great crises, in a revolutionary process interrupted by setbacks. But if it should be accomplished, it will automatically reduce the present division of the world into two ideological "camps" to the far more manageable proportions of normal power rivalry between two great states and their respective allies, and will by that much increase the chance of solving a number of outstanding border conflicts now embittered by ideology, and of thus turning the present atomic stalemate into real peace.

In the second place, and quite independent of the above possibility, we are observing even now a tendency toward the loosening of the two great military-ideological blocs, and toward the emergence of various degrees of independence and of various types of neutrality. The two super-powers, having attempted for a long time to push their military frontiers right up against each other, have lately been pulling back and allowing the no-man's-land between them to grow; and their political and economic rivalry for the support of the "uncommitted" nations has tended both to loosen discipline within the Communist bloc and to make the cost of "colonialist" relapses by Western powers prohibitive.

I believe that this tendency will continue, and that Mr. Lippmann is right in talking of the dissolution of an old world order, inevitably accompanied for the time being by the growth of nationalist anarchy with its dangers. I also believe that the growth of the military no-man's-land is basically in the interest of the West, whose long-term advantages in the political and economic competition for the support of independent nations are overwhelming. This is most strikingly true of Europe, the continent which has had the most ample comparative experience of democratic and totalitarian rule; and I conclude that it is to the fundamental interest of the West that the problems of European security should be solved by a phased, negotiated withdrawal of both the super-powers from the heart of the continent, thus allowing all the nations to develop in freedom.

AT the same time, the growth of nationalist anarchy is already beginning to produce an increase in the authority of the United Nations and a focussing of hopes on that institution. The moral authority of the UN cannot, of course, do away with the fundamental realities of power; it will continue to find its limit whenever one of the super-powers is prepared to defy world opinion and fight for its interests. But it can become increasingly effective in stopping the anarchic use of force by secondary and minor powers, including cases which amount politically to aggression by proxy on behalf of one of the super-powers themselves; and because it has become the main forum where the political competition for "uncommitted" opinion is conducted, it can effectively modify the conduct of these super-powers, reduce the chances of a direct clash, and help to bring about partial compromises between them and to supervise their execution. Such a role will still fall far short of the vision of world government, even of a limited world government for the growing "no-man's-land" between the military blocs; but it will nevertheless be a real, effective and important role far beyond anything we have seen in the past.

The other great issue of the decade ahead will be

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whether the great underdeveloped nations of Asia and Africa can solve their economic problem while preserving internal freedom—whether they can make the large-scale investments needed for development and employ their rapidly growing populations without depressing their low standard of life to an intolerable degree, at least for a prolonged "transitional period." This issue, at present symbolized in the question whether Communist China or democratic India will do better, would exist even if there were no Communist powers in the world; failure to solve the economic problem of these peoples could even by itself give rise to new forms of totalitarianism. Much of the outcome of the coming decade will depend on whether the advanced, democratic nations recognize in time that their economic aid to their poorer neighbors is needed not as a bribe to win allies, but as an insurance policy to preserve the political freedom of a very large part of mankind, and by that to prevent the growth of new and dangerous foci of totalitarian and militarist infection which would threaten the peace of the world.

RICHARD LOWENTHAL *writes on international politics for the* London Observer.

What the United Nations Can and Cannot Do

by ANDRE PHILIP

AS A RESULT of the events in Egypt, there is serious tension at the present hour in the relations between France and the United Nations, a state of tension which will not fail to grow worse when the Assembly enters upon the discussion of the Algerian problem. French public opinion, rather poorly informed concerning international realities today, is allowing itself to be drawn into affirmations of national sovereignty and into a systematic campaign against the UN contrary to our country's traditional position. It must not be forgotten that since the time of the League of Nations, France has always been in the van of those countries that called for a strong international organization, arbitration and the organization of security through the creation of an international force. It has demanded the abolition of the right of veto and the strengthening of the Assembly's powers. The about-face executed today by the French Government and, in its wake, by public opinion is, let us hope, only temporary. But the problem of the UN must nevertheless be closely examined in order that we may determine our international policies for the next decade not in the abstract, but by considering all the particulars of present world realities. These are the factors I should like to endeavor to analyze in the following way:

1. We must not ask of the United Nations more than it can give. It is not a supranational body capable of laying down the law and having it enforced. It is a place for discussion, a meeting place of the delegates of sovereign governments, a place for contact, negotiation and compromise. Its most effective work is accomplished by specialized institutions such as the ILO, FAO and GATT or regional commissions such as the Economic Commission for Europe or the one for Latin America. Specialized institutions can be effective mainly to the extent that a competent and well-staffed secretariat is capable of determining definite tasks for itself and of taking independent initiatives on certain points. The political function of the UN is limited both by its lack of powers and by the confusion which naturally arises from the periodic meeting of some 70 nations, all having different interests and moved by conflicting passions.

2. The most conspicuous body of the United Nations is the Assembly. It is invested with few powers, since, at the most, it can only make recommendations. It is essentially a debating forum with wide reverberations, which contributes effectively to the molding of international public opinion. We have always desired this molding of opinion. France has always endeavored to increase the Assembly's powers; she is astonished today to see it take a stand against her in the Egyptian affair and in the matter of Algeria; and, since we always have time to inveigh against our judges, advantage is taken of this to engage in harsh criticism of the Assembly's very composition.

The Assembly, they say, has come more and more under the influence of non-democratic peoples; countries like Great Britain and France, who brought to the world its ideas of freedom, have no lessons to take from backward countries—the critics righteously maintain. Naturally, they do not fail to mention the slavery-practicing character of certain countries like Yemen and Saudi Arabia. These criticisms are in great measure correct. It is certain that a large number of countries of the world, and the underdeveloped countries in particular, are far from having attained in their internal structure the form of democracy to which we are accustomed in the West. Does this mean that for this reason certain countries should be excluded from the United Nations?

The persistence of slavery in Yemen might, to be sure, justify such a decision, but after what has occurred in Hungary a corresponding measure would have to be taken with respect to the USSR. In that case could the United Nations continue to include South Africa, where the situation of the blacks is at least as serious as that of the slaves in Yemen? And would it not then be possible

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to raise again the question of certain other dictatorships, beginning with Franco's?

In actual fact, if we begin to pass judgments based on merit, the United Nations would find itself reduced to the Atlantic Pact countries, which are almost the only real democracies of our time. Besides, the judgments would have to be passed by the Assembly with its present majority and it is quite possible that certain nations, taking their stand on the Charter of the United Nations, might cast serious doubts on the democratic character of the present French policy in Algeria.

It is observed that the UN Assembly is being dominated more and more by the underdeveloped nations of Asia and Latin America, which, in association with the USSR and its satellites, can easily succeed in forming a majority; and the situation will progressively grow worse in proportion to the rate at which the emancipation of African countries continues and new States are born. Here again, we are faced with a reality, but how can we succeed in correcting it?

If, instead of representation on the basis of one vote per State, a system of proportional representation were set up on the basis of population, the situation would be even more serious; and it seems difficult indeed to establish today a system of proportional representation based on the wealth and national income of each country. We are no longer living in 1830, and an electoral system based on property qualifications is outdated on the international plane as well as within the national framework.

The difficulties to which we have just referred are not due therefore to the structure of the United Nations. They are merely the expression of reality in the world today, just as it is. It is a fact that a whole succession of countries, formerly colonies, are now attaining independence and that the underdeveloped countries entertain among themselves, for the moment, a deep feeling of solidarity. These countries represent a billion and a half inhabitants; that is, half the world's population and no juridical structure will prevent half the peoples from exerting a heavy influence on the fortunes of mankind.

Does this mean that we are destined in the decades to come to be always a minority in the United Nations? Certainly not. All the more so since a recommendation, in order to be valid, must command two-thirds of the votes and that is impossible without the assent of the United States. A close association between the United States and Europe is entirely capable of counterbalancing a coalition of the USSR and the underdeveloped countries. On the other hand, an association of Europe, the United States and the underdeveloped countries will be capable, every time, of providing the required two-thirds majority against the USSR. But it is necessary that our policies, and this is what the United States has finally understood, aim at attaching the underdeveloped countries to us rather than pitting them against us. The fate of the world in the decade ahead will depend on our capacity rapidly to insure the orientation of these countries toward independence and to establish with them such ties of economic solidarity that they will find it to their interest to progress toward democracy and to cling to the free countries rather than to Russia.

3. Outside the Assembly, effective power is represented by the Security Council. In the minds of the drafters of the Charter there was to be a directory composed of the five great powers and charged with policing the world. It was hoped that the great powers, being conscious of their world-wide responsibility, would succeed in reaching the necessary compromises among themselves and in evolving a common will. But that has not occurred.

Today there are no longer five great powers: China has been liquidated and the Egyptian expedition has shown that France and Great Britain, even combined, do not represent a force in the world, but merely two associated weaknesses.

Agreement has not been reached between the two great powers. The USSR, every time its vital interests were involved, has used the right of veto to block action by the Security Council. In addition, its international policy has had for its aim the stirring up of trouble everywhere possible and the pursuit of a policy of nationalistic demagogy in an endeavor to attract the underdeveloped nations.

The United States, after groping for a long time, seems now to have determined its international policy: first of all, it protects its vital interests by warning the USSR that any intervention in certain regions of the world would lead to world war. It is this which today insures the West's freedom, since the Atlantic Pact guarantees that any attack against Europe would immediately bring American forces into action.

On the other hand, the United States is extremely prudent (it showed this, alas, in the Hungarian matter) when it is a question of intervening in the zones which up to the present have been under Russian influence and where direct intervention might risk bringing on an international conflict. In all other matters the United States considers itself the secular arm of the United Nations. It will not intervene except on the basis of an Assembly resolution, but will act each time to insure respect for the decisions taken by the latter with the required two-thirds majority.

4. Today we are witnessing, contrary to repeated assertions in our press, not a crisis in nor a weakening of the United Nations, but its strengthening.

This strengthening began on November 3, 1950, when, on France's initiative, the famous Resolution No. 377 was approved, which has just recently been invoked against us:

If the Security Council, because of a lack of unanim-

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> ity, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to members concerning the corrective measures to be taken, including the use of armed force, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

In order to enforce its decisions, the UN Assembly, in accordance with what France has long demanded, has just created an international army. Let us not have any illusions: the United Nations contingent will not represent an effective force for a long time to come; its value is mainly symbolic; its presence on a territory signifies that if action is committed against it, the offender will automatically find a majority in the Assembly to condemn it and organize sanctions.

But the real sanction can only be in the hands of the two great powers. When the French landed at Port Said, the Bulganin letter clearly indicated that if our army persisted the USSR would resort to intervention under the guise of sending volunteers, alleging this as a unilateral enforcement of the decision of the United Nations. It must be added that this would have been just as illegal as the action we French had taken at Suez, ostensibly to insure the enforcement of a resolution of the Security Council. The position of the United States is infinitely more flexible. *Except in cases where their vital interests are directly threatened, the Americans will never intervene except after obtaining a prior mandate to that end from the United Nations.* But they will intervene every time, either in a military way or, preferably, with economic sanctions which they are strong enough to bring into play.

5. In fact, the following conclusion may be drawn from the foregoing analysis:

(a) Today we have come to the end of national policies. Under present circumstances, only the United States and the USSR federal systems can have a foreign policy. If Europe wishes to make its voice heard, it is essential that it press toward its unification as soon as possible and that it decide at once on setting up among its peoples a diplomatic organism which would permit the elaboration and determination of a common foreign policy.

(b) Europe cannot defend its interest except in close association with the United States. The Atlantic Alliance is its sole guarantee against Russian aggression. Economic co-operation within this alliance constitutes its only possibility of economic expansion. Within the United Nations, a Europe-United States bloc will always render it possible to avoid a hostile majority and will often permit winning a favorable majority.

(c) The fate of the world in the approaching decade will depend on the final orientation of the underdeveloped countries. It is chiefly through the United Nations as intermediary that it may be possible to elaborate a positive policy with respect to these countries and to win them over progressively to the free world.

(d) Until France has completely changed her policy of hostility toward the underdeveloped countries and of resistance to the liberation movement among formerly-colonized peoples, she will find a majority in the United Nations to condemn her and will encounter, in the United States, a growing pressure to oblige her to bow to the will of the majority of international public opinion.

(e) There must be no question of repeating Mr. Pinay's gesture of bad humor when he walked out of the United Nations Assembly. You may go out the door once and remain standing behind it with the hope that the others will come to fetch you; but you cannot repeat the operation a second time. If France were to leave the United Nations, she would merely risk losing her seat on the Security Council, and hence her right of veto, and finding herself powerless in the face of the Assembly's decisions, supported by American economic pressure.

(f) It is time to come out of dreamings inherited from the past and to see the world of today just as it is. In this world the time for isolated action by small and medium-sized nations has passed. Our real interests will be defended only through a policy of European unification, of close alliance with the United States, of understanding for the underdeveloped countries, and finally of diplomatic action within the United Nations in order to recover our moral and cultural prestige, fallen today, and to regain for France an influence which she should never have lost.

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The West Need Not Fear Peaceful Co-existence

by SERGE DE GUNZBURG

THE SESSION of the NATO council held in Paris toward the end of 1956 illustrated very strikingly the utter failure of the policies pursued by the West since the Atlantic Alliance was signed in 1949. For all those years, the West devoted its efforts to building up a military force which would work as a deterrent to the Soviet Union and prevent further progress of Communism. At the same time Western diplomacy persistently

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refused to try and solve the *serious* problems which divide the two worlds: disarmament, European security, Germany, Korea, Indo-China, Formosa, the Middle-East. This persistent refusal can only be accounted for by the presumption that the West has been relying on a disintegration of the Soviet bloc. The upheaval in Hungary and the growing unrest in the other Communist countries, including the Soviet Union itself, has most unexpectedly brought nearer the fulfillment of that dream. But instead of rejoicing, Western leaders are terrified lest this upheaval, particularly if it spreads to Eastern Germany, bring about a third world war.

On the strategic side, it has become increasingly obvious that the creation of an overwhelming force—consisting of both conventional forces and atomic and thermonuclear weapons—cannot be achieved for the very simple reason that the West cannot afford it. As a result of this double diplomatic and strategic failure, the West is compelled to consider a complete reappraisal of East-West relations.

BEFORE this new decade becomes much older, the West must answer the question: what goal does it want to achieve? Is it (a) the destruction of Communism through a victorious third world war, or (b) the disintegration of Communism through an internal upheaval aided by the West, or (c) peace through compromise according to the principle of "live and let live"?

The first solution may, I think, be ruled out. It involves the certainty of complete mutual destruction and, any how, the West has not got the superior force that would assure final victory.

The second solution still seems to be the basis of American thinking. But recent events have shown its dangers. The West has refrained from giving any effective help to the Hungarian insurgents, because it feared that intervention in Hungary might lead to war with Russia. The further the satellite upheavals spread, the greater becomes the peril. There may be cracks within the Soviet Union itself, as shown by the recent student unrest in Lithuania and in the Moscow University, but the regime remains strong and cannot be expected to collapse without putting up a fight. Solution number two, therefore, leads us back to solution number one and must be discarded.

The remaining choice is peaceful co-existence. It can only be achieved through compromise and mutual concessions. The West, so far, has refused to act on this choice and has assumed that compromise can only be achieved at its own expense. At the core of such thinking there lurks an unwarranted inferiority complex. In a world at peace, why should the competition between the Western world and the Communist world be necessarily lost by the West?

On the contrary, events have shown that with the comparative relaxation of tension the people within the Soviet orbit itself have turned away from Communism and neutral leaders such as Pandit Nehru and Marshal Tito who were intensely critical of America at the time of the "brink of war" policy are now visiting or would like to visit Washington.

The question, then, for the next decade of Western diplomacy is on what basis can a compromise be achieved between the two worlds. Three major items of any co-existence pattern were listed at the Geneva conference last July:

> Progressive disarmament, including nuclear disarmament; Reunification of Germany; A European security pact.

The whole process was wrecked by the West's insistence on the inclusion of a reunified Germany in NATO. If the West gives up this demand, so obviously unacceptable to the Soviets, the whole pattern conceived at Geneva could take substantive form. By accepting a neutralized Germany, the West could gain, first, the overthrow of the present East German regime. Communism would retreat one step and the nightmare of an East German explosion which could lead to a global war would be over. And this agreement on the neutralization of Germany might lead to a wider agreement on the neutralization of the countries neighboring Germany and, thereby, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe—the main goal of the Eisenhower Administration when it first came into office.

In Asia, the unsolved problems should also be settled on a "give and take" basis. If the idea of destroying Communism is abandoned, Communist China must, of course, be recognized. The Korean and Vietnamese problems could be solved through free elections.

Whereas a victory of the non-Communist South would be likely in Korea, the victory of the pro-Communist North in Vietnam is less certain now than it was at the end of the war in 1954. Finally, the fate of Formosa could be left to be settled later by a plebiscite and meanwhile the island could be neutralized.

As regards the Middle East, Western fears of Russian penetration have resulted in Russia's almost dominating the area. The best that can be done now is to face the facts and agree *with Russia* on the terms of a peace settlement between Israel and her neighbors. There is little doubt that Russia would go along with such an approach. The safety of Israel could be guaranteed by the Big Four.

IN THE rest of the world, the termination of the Cold War would leave the door open to peaceful competition in the economic field. Is Western free enterprise unable to compete with Soviet offers? There is every reason to believe, on the contrary, that in a world at peace, the Soviet Union would find it exceedingly difficult to compete. Her own people's demands for a higher standard

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of living would prevent her from pursuing a policy of large-scale exports at dumping prices. And there is every likelihood also that, once strategic embargoes are removed and the Peking Government is recognized, the West would be able to compete successfully with Soviet Russia within China itself.

The opposite risk of the people of the West being won over to Communism in a freely competitive world is a much smaller one. Given a free choice, it is more likely that the man in the street in Moscow would want an American motorcar and American jazz rather than that the average American would want Russian style cabbage soup or Socialist realism.

One question remains to be answered: if an East-West compromise is to be achieved in this new decade should it be negotiated by the Big Two—the US and the USSR—or should others be associated? The present trend is toward the first solution. We, in Europe, would rather have a return to the 1945 Big Four (or Big Five) formula. The bitterness caused here by a compromise worked out at the expense of Europe would create new problems and jeopardize the gains so painfully won.

After World War II, the Russian "niet" resulted in the formation of an anti-Soviet Western coalition.

In the last years of that past decade the American "no" consolidated the Soviet bloc.

It is high time that both sides ceased cutting off their noses to spite their faces.

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The Certainty of Change

by JOSEPH C. HARSCH

THE FOREIGN policies of the United States are behaving at the beginning of 1957 rather like a small boat caught in a rip tide at the harbor mouth.

This is not surprising because vast and conflicting tides are in fact pushing against the hull of the boat and, inevitably, giving it an erratic course.

It sets its rudder and sails for friendship with the Arab-Asian lands and Vice President Nixon hails a declaration of independence from British colonialism. But almost immediately a crosscurrent of recognition comes along that British colonies provide many of the air bases upon which US air-atomic "deterrent" power rests, so the same Mr. Nixon pledges his personal assurance that the Congress will look kindly upon ways and means of rescuing the pound sterling from Suez crisis pressures.

The State Department decides that since Mr. Nehru of India could usefully come to Washington perhaps the time has come for President Eisenhower to hear what Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia has to say about the inner meaning of events in Moscow. But instantly ancient and deep-seated prejudices about dealing with Communists, any Communists, rise out of the reflexes of the "Cold War" years.

IN retrospect the old decade of the "Cold War" had an appealing simplicity. The "enemy" was well defined. The purpose was to thwart his designs. The means were scarcely even controversial. In majestic succession America proceeded from Greek-Turkish aid to Marshall Plan, to armed battle in Korea, to the NATO alliance, and to reconciliation with Japan and Germany. It was a simple, direct, black and white world in which there were only Communists and non-Communists, and he who was not for us was against us.

There is many a nostalgic backward glance in Washington toward those days, and many a mind which does not accept the fact that times appear to be changing; that in these changed times a "national Communist" may be significantly different from a Moscow Communist; that it might be national self interest, not pie-in-the-sky millenialism, to seek a limit on strategic weapons testing with the Soviets while the United States still has a presumed margin of advantage.

The old charts were drawn on the assumption that Communism could mold the minds of youth to its doctrines. But in Hungary youth showed itself repelled rather than converted by a decade of indoctrination. So the old charts are no longer valid.

There was some relaxation of old policies after the "meeting at the Summit" and the sequel was the vigorous penetration of the Middle East by Soviet influence. When the Middle East exploded in the Suez crisis Washington tried to invoke Bandung and found itself destroying NATO. When Hungary exploded, Washington tried to forget its past promises of "liberation" and tapped Moscow on the wrist with a suspension of "cultural" mission exchanges, while simultaneously refusing to discuss matters of substance with its old allies, Britain and France.

There had long since ceased to be a defined course and an accepted and continuing set of policies. The time had come when Republicans, who once killed the League of Nations, were basing their hopes on the "moral force" of the United Nations and Democrats who built the UN were questioning its sufficiency to all the needs of the times, and John Foster Dulles was berating the British for non-consultation, but blandly asserting that under some circumstances the United States would do the same.

All of this was merely evidence of the awesome complexity of foreign policy at a time when the postwar order of things was breaking up and the new form and

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shape of the world was not yet visible. The only certainty was the certainty of change.

Will the United States find itself opening diplomatic relations with Communist China in the near future? It can happen. Mr. Nehru left Washington prepared to urge Chou En-lai to clear the way by releasing the last ten US prisoners. He left behind him also a Washington which was locked in an agonizing debate over a "package" program for negotiations with the Soviet Union which Harold Stassen had put together and which possibly might change the whole context of US-Soviet relations.

At the heart of the Stassen "package" was the idea of a phased reduction of foreign troops in central Europe. Was it already too late for such a project? Some thought that the Hungarian revolt had made it too late. Others argued that events in Hungary had only underlined the imperative necessity for negotiating the neutralization of all of central Europe.

Before a decision could be reached on the Stassen "package"—currently being labelled a "disengagement policy"—there first had to be a resolution of the argument over whether Hungary meant that this was the time to press Moscow harder, or the time to press it less hard in order to allow it to extricate itself from its own blunder.

Should the decision be in favor of an attempt at "disengagement" what would the consequences be? One consequence would be the contraction of NATO from its present inclusiveness to the original concept of a US-Canada-Britain-Low Countries-France alliance.

But how can the basic Atlantic Alliance be reconciled with the new love affair with Nehru and the Bandung countries?

Every suggestion raised new problems and dangerous implications. Over all brooded the atomic stalemate, which wasn't as settled a condition as the word "stalemate" implies because within the stalemate both the US and the USSR were racing toward intercontinental guided missiles. Can anything be done to avert the arrival of the day when the North woods of both would be seeded with these missiles, aimed and set and ready for the finger on the button?

It is easy to ask questions in Washington during these days. It is much harder to answer them. Dimly ahead, everyone can see a world order very different from the black and white pattern of the last decade. Two great empires of power are breaking up. Can the transition be managed without the ultimate violence of a great war? What will happen if this disaster can be avoided? As the new decade opened, apparently China was rising to take the place of Japan in the prewar pattern. The chances seemed to be that within even a year the United States would have recognized it as a member of the community of nations. What of Germany? Would it become part of a new Western European community, or would it forge a new central Europe living in a twilight zone between East and West? Already Bonn was seeking diplomatic relations with Poland. And what of the former "satellites"? Would Moscow release them to the new central European system provided Washington fell back on the basic Atlantic Alliance?

Small wonder that in 1956 John Foster Dulles sounded sometimes like the cold warrior of 1952 and sometimes like the harbinger of a new order—usually in the same speech.

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Will Russia Become A Chinese Satellite?

by HUGH MASSINGHAM

"How is the coming decade likely to differ from the postwar decade of 1946-1956?"—that is the editor's question, and it can surely be discussed on several levels. Politically, one of the puzzles of our present period is that the Russians imagine that the threat to their survival comes from the West. Imprisoned in the theories and struggles that had a validity during the early years of the Revolution, Mr. Khrushchev is like any hack journalist—20 years behind the times. For the real menace comes from the East, not the West; from China and not from the US. A decade from now, the Kremlin will be struggling to avoid becoming a satellite of a new, vast and arrogant empire whose manpower may outnumber the Russians by ten to one. Before long anything the Americans can do in the way of aggression, the Chinese will be able to do much better.

For all their outward indifference to this question, its reality nags at every Russian mind like a sore tooth. "One of these days," an American diplomat said as a joke to his opposite number in the Russian Embassy, "you and I will be allies." The answer was surprisingly frank. Raising his glass, the Russian said, "I'll certainly drink to that." And then, apparently with glee, "To hell with the Chinese!"

Even at this early stage of the second postwar decade there are signs that Russia and China are not pursuing the same aims, even though they may seem to be superficially in agreement. China was undoubtedly annoyed by the Russian visit to India, the reaction being that Khrushchev and Bulganin were trespassing on her territory. On

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their part the Chinese have been doing some quiet underground work in the dispute between Russia and the Western satellites. They have let it be known that they are entirely in sympathy with the Polish revolution.

The Russians have always been an Eastern people and their preoccupation with the West has been a false and unnatural development. Certainly they are more aware than any Westerner of the potentialities of the East—its vast resources, its untapped fanaticism, its unlimited ambition. The reality will become more oppressive with every year that passes and must increasingly have an influence on Russian policy. The time may not be far off when Russia will be forced to seek an accommodation with her present enemies.

THE social and political problems are much harder to analyze. Marxist slogans and theories—the propaganda, half believed even by skeptics, that Russia had solved the strains common to capitalist communities—have led us to forget a few elementary truths about humanity and human behavior. When we talk about American politicians we do so on the assumption that they are men subject, like ourselves, to original sin—that they are under the influence of ambition, vindictiveness, passion and envy. When we talk about the Kremlin, we often write as if they were free of these frailities, as if they were a body of scientists released from the emotions of human fallability and objectively carrying out the laws of a philosophy that has an answer to every political dilemma.

We have made the same mistake in our social analysis. Every new society carries in its womb the monster of its own destruction, and that is as true of Russian Communism as of any other community. By delaying this natural process, by refusing to make any concession, the Stalin dictatorship may have given it an explosive force that will now make a peaceful evolution very, very difficult. Indeed the present agitation among the students of Moscow and Leningrad makes the Kremlin look more and more like the Czarist regime in its decline.

Although we cannot recognize the trends, our own Western society is subject to the same evolutionary and revolutionary forces as the Russian. An equilibrium is never reached because no community seems capable of satisfying both the spiritual and materialist sides of man's nature. The only solution is for a society to call a halt at some point in its furious economic development; to say, "We have at last as high a standard of life as anybody can reasonably want: let us now pause and concentrate on the meaning of life." But the pace is too hot, the appetite for self-gratification too imperious: in the West automation follows industrialization; in the East progress is measured by the yearly increase in the number of steel plants and hydrogen bombs. Along with this grows a spiritual unrest, even a spiritual disgust, that can be denied only for a limited time.

The great appeal of Communism has always been that it would enlarge the area of human freedom. The faithful could excuse Stalinist reaction on the ground that it was merely a temporary necessity: presently the march would be resumed toward the Promised Land. There was, however, one basic fallacy in this argument. No society has yet been invented that was capable of plotting its own downfall. As Russian Communism developed, it became more and more clear to the average Soviet citizen that there was less and less chance of the State withering away. Communism has thus lived on to repudiate its fundamental tenet, and the revolution that was to liberate the human spirit has suppressed it.

Because of this sharp issue there is a sense in which the idealist on the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain has a simpler task than the spiritual traveller in the West. While the works of John Stuart Mill moulder away on our bookshelves, a Russian can find in them a freshness that is denied to a Westerner who has never lost his liberty. Freedom, individual responsibility—these are words that have a sound like Thor's hammer to any Soviet ear. In the West they frequently seem as stale as yesterday's newspapers.

On our side of the Iron Curtain, and particularly in Europe, the Hungarian tragedy and the final collapse of Communist moral pretensions have produced a spiritual vacuum. For the moment there is no clue as to what will eventually fill it. The Churches? But they have yet to prove that they can refurbish the old truths and teachings and give them a new social content that is likely to stir the millions who have ceased to be Christian even in name. Democratic Socialism? To the young this seems increasingly dull and respectable. Perhaps the answer is to be found in those small tentative groupings that are now springing up among disillusioned European Communists. Amateurish though they may seem, the historian of 1967 may decide that they were the humble seed that contained the moral and intellectual oaks of the future.

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Bandung Powers—Danger Zone for US Policy

by IRVING KRISTOL

TWO EVENTS—the Hungarian revolution and the Suez fiasco—accomplished in a few days something that years of diplomacy could not produce: a European settlement. Not a formal settlement, to be sure—at least not yet. But a *de facto* settlement nonetheless. Western

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Europe has shown itself too pathetically weak militarily to constitute any kind of bulwark against the Soviet empire. And Eastern Europe has shown itself too unreliable politically to serve as any kind of bulwark against the West. Neither Washington nor Moscow might be willing as yet to negotiate the question of a neutralized Europe but that cannot obscure the fact that, neutral or not, Europe has very nearly neutralized itself. All that Russia can hope to retain in Eastern Europe, during the coming years, is its military bases; and that is all that is of any real use to us in Western Europe.

This outcome is, of course, unsatisfactory to both the Soviet Union and ourselves. Nevertheless, it is far more unsatisfactory to them. The elimination of the Western European countries as a military force does not, at least, threaten our own equilibrium. Whereas the political disaffection of her satellites does constitute a serious internal problem for the Soviet Union—one which it will take many years to solve, assuming it can be solved at all.

But such a European settlement is, by now, only a minor episode in international affairs. Western Europe may still be the center of world civilization; it is no longer anywhere near the center of world politics. It is not so much that it lacks the strength to intervene. Potentially, in industrial power and even sheer numbers, the strength is there; but the will is not. Colonel Nasser has reported that when he received the Franco-British ultimatum, he thought there was a 50-50 chance it was merely a bluff. As it turned out, he was right, to all intents and purposes. When one's ultimatums can be regarded so disrespectfully, one had better not bother sending them at all.

THE basic problem of American policy in the next decade will be, not the Cold War in Europe, but the defining of its relations to the Asian-African bloc. Here, we are in the very difficult position of not being able to do much positive good for ourselves, while being easily able to do much harm. The Communist myth may be discredited in the West, or even inside the Soviet Union itself (as I think it is). But a different species of this myth continues to flourish unaffected in the "underdeveloped" countries. There, it is no utopian political metaphysic, but a crude quasi-religion which (a) legitimizes the rule of the new élites, recruited largely from the military and the intelligentsia, (b) enables them to establish relatively stable and effective despotisms, and (c) provides them with a rationale for a belligerent anti-Western policy which most of them hanker for, anyway.

This species of Communism is not open to disillusionment, since it really has no illusions. It is less likely to cling to self-defeating economic dogmas, since it has no genuine interest in creating "a new social order." It believes its own propaganda uncritically, because it has nothing else to believe, and because this allows and encourages it to do what all of its instincts, noble and base, demand that it do: and this is simply to end the 400 years of Western dominance of world politics—to open a new chapter in world history, *their* chapter.

To the extent that American policy stands in the way of Asian-African aspirations, we shall further inflame these very sore feelings that are tempted to find comfort in a form of Eastern Communism. It is not, however, so easy for us to step out of the way. We can—as we have been doing—gain some credit by assisting in the liquidation of the remnants of Western European colonialism. But, because of our profound ties with Western Europe, our assistance must be largely passive rather than active; and this is just as likely to be interpreted as a sign of weakness as of generosity. Moreover, there is one critical area where our own interests come into direct conflict with the countries of the Asian-African bloc. These countries are prepared—even eager—to recognize Chinese hegemony over Western and Southeast Asia (in return for Chinese recognition of Indian hegemony in South Asia, Egyptian hegemony in the Middle East, etc.). We shall never be able to grant *this* kind of recognition to Communist China, meaning as it would a withdrawal from our bases on Formosa, Japan and Okinawa, the dissolution of SEATO, and the like.

If only because of this question of China, we are not in a position to lend uncritical support to the Asian-African bloc (to say nothing of assuming its leadership, as Chester Bowles has rather fancifully suggested). Nor is it going to be much use for us to try to win their affections by extra-political means. Glossy magazines extolling the "American way of life" will only excite their envy, and perhaps their contempt too, since this is not a way of life that automatically recommends itself to them. As for massive economic aid, this has the disadvantage, first of exacerbating their sense of inferiority, and second of placing such a strain upon their primitive economic and social systems as to make them even more vulnerable to Communism than they were before. Basically, whether or not an 'underdeveloped' country (and I use inverted commas because many of these countries are simply poor and will always remain 'underdeveloped') goes Communist is largely dependent on the strength and vitality of its own religio-moral traditions. The less we meddle with such a country's internal affairs, the more chance these traditions will have to assert themselves.

As I see it, then, America is in for an unpleasant couple of decades in world affairs. We can take what consolation we wish from the thought that, despite the ineptness with which we have been conducting our foreign policy, this evolving situation has largely been outside our control: we are white and we are rich—this is quite enough to ensure that the resurgent powers of Asia and Africa will, in the nature of things, be unsympathetic

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toward us. We can also take comfort in the fact that there are still two crucial parts of the world where our prospects are far from gloomy.

1. The first of these is Latin America—a continent which we inexplicably tend to overlook, despite the fact that it is both far richer and more populous than Africa, and less alien to our own ways of thinking. Here, where our physical presence is sufficiently overshadowing, and our military strength sufficiently proximate to inhibit a Communist *coup d'etat,* we do have an opportunity to build up and obtain powerful allies. (Brazil is likely, in 50 years, to be no less important a power than India.) Here, there is an unanswerable case for generous economic aid, technical assistance, lavish cultural interchanges, etc. If it is a question of choice between using our resources to aid South America or Asia—and it is bound to be, since our resources are not unlimited—then South America has every claim to priority.

2. The second is Europe paradoxically enough. There is some reason to believe that the decline of Western Europe is not an irreversible process. Economically, these countries are making striking—in the cases of Germany and Italy, fantastic—progress. Perhaps more significant, there has been throughout Western Europe an upturn in the birth-rate which promises, in the future, to release a new surge of energy and self-confidence. Europe is becoming younger every day—literally. Whether this new youthfulness can find political expression will depend mainly on the ability of these countries to establish some sort of union, despite all the historical and psychological obstacles to it. In furthering this process, there is not much that America can do which it is not already doing. We can, ultimately, only hope. And we ought to hope hard; a rejuvenated Western Europe, rid of its colonial millstones and enjoying a common market, would give a bloom of health to the world's complexion —as we see it, of course!

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Red China Versus India

by MICHAEL LINDSAY

ON A REALLY long-term view the basic problem for human society is adjustment to the new environment being produced by scientific progress. Thousands of years ago the development of organized agriculture provided the material basis which made civilization possible, and until recently all civilizations have had a basis of peasant agriculture. The development of science and technology which has been accelerating for the past 200 years or so may well prove to be a similar shift in the trend of human development. The new situation offers great opportunities; for example, the possibility of a civilization no longer based on the division into a cultured minority and an exploited majority. To use Professor Toynbee's terms, human society faces a challenge and the future depends on its ability to make a successful response.

IT is easy to suggest some of the problems that have to be faced. The new environment requires wider co-ordination of human activities. How can this be obtained? And how can one prevent the means of co-ordination from being used to maintain some form of "oligarchical collectivism"? It seems, for example, fairly certain that the new society will have to accept responsibility for planning its population. All sorts of new problems arise in politics and culture when the masses are no longer willing to accept the authority of traditional elites. And this list of problems could easily be extended. We do not know what form of social organization will be required to meet these problems but it is fairly safe to predict that it will require patterns of behavior considerably different from those of existing cultures.

In this perspective the various forms of totalitarianism can be seen as neurotic responses to the challenge. They are psychologically explicable as means for evading the responsibility for facing the future rationally. All totalitarian systems have an irrationalist basic philosophy, which serves to remove a feeling of responsibility for thinking rationally on basic problems. The individual in a totalitarian organization can evade responsibility by a blind faith in his leaders. And totalitarian theories often promise simplified short cuts to the new society, such as the claim of Communist theory that everything else desirable will follow from a change in property relations.

For the past few decades the threat from totalitarian systems has greatly complicated the problem for the rest of the world, but it has not really altered it. Many totalitarian policies have been wrong answers to real problems and the free world can only compete with totalitarianism by providing better answers.

One can see in the free world developments which may be at least the beginnings of a successful response; but one can also see a different type of neurotic response whose symptoms have been a paralysis of initiative and clear thinking and persistence in patterns of thought and behavior which had proved ineffective in the modern world.

Turning to the narrower field of postwar international politics, one can pick out a number of cases in which the Western powers have shown initiative and imagination but these have been the exceptions. On the whole Western policy has tended to follow patterns appropriate to the world of half a century ago—a world in which the people even in the more democratic countries were con-

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tent to leave the conduct of foreign policy in the hands of a small group of experts and in which the powers maneuvered for limited objectives of national interest. There has been little adjustment to the modern world of ideological conflict, for which the religious struggles of 16th and 17th Century Europe would be some parallel, and to the totally new situation which was summed up by Marc Bloch as early as 1940 when he said, "The masses no longer obey, they *follow,* either because they have been hypnotized or because they *know.*" A democratic government can now only follow a rational foreign policy with the support of an informed public opinion at home and American foreign policy in particular has suffered from the influence of an uninformed public opinion.

SUCH considerations imply that it is extremely important not only to have a rational policy but also to present it effectively to public opinion. The totalitarian powers have been willing to devote large resources to influencing public opinion and in the conduct of their foreign policy have given a high priority to producing situations which could be used for publicity. Their success has been limited by the real weakness of the case they can present. It would be foolish for the Western powers simply to follow totalitarian methods because the best techniques for publicizing a case that will stand critical examination differ from those required for publicizing a case that cannot, but they have everything to gain from the right kind of publicity. In fact they have thought predominantly in military terms and have consistently neglected publicity even when they have had an extremely strong case. To give only the most striking illustration: Communist publicity has made very effective use of the issue of German rearmament; the Western powers have never effectively publicized the fact that remilitarization in the Soviet zone started years before that of West Germany and that it is still more militarized than West Germany.

It is likely that publicity will be even more important in the coming decade than it has been in the past. The influence of the uncommitted Afro-Asian powers has greatly increased, especially in the United Nations. Developments in the Soviet bloc have increased the chances of some sections of Communism repudiating totalitarianism. And technical developments have changed the military situation. With the development of atomic weapons and ballistic missiles a major war would involve the almost complete destruction of both sides, which implies that neither side is likely to risk such a war.

The struggle with totalitarianism will probably continue to dominate the international scene but the military factor will become less important. Military action will only be taken when it seems fairly certain that it will not lead to general war. The main struggle will be to influence the uncommitted powers and public opinion on the other side.

The results of this struggle will depend on the ability of the Western powers to adapt their policies to the new situation. The free world can only succeed if it can prove more efficient in making necessary social changes. For example, the future of Asia is likely to depend on the relative success of the totalitarian system of China or the more democratic system of India in solving the problems of modernizing a traditional economic system. In the field of foreign policy there will have to be more thought and more initiative and much more imagination about the probable reaction of policies on uncommitted opinion. An illustration can make this last point clear. American defense of the Kuomintang Government on Formosa is an issue which alienates most Asian opinion. American defense of a Formosa whose people had shown their desire for independence would be an issue which could win Asian support.

The probability of a successful response will depend on the readiness of Western leadership to act not only against totalitarianism but also against the people in their own countries whose vested interests, or simple conservatism, make them oppose the measures necessary for success.

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The New Pattern of World Politics

by HANS J. MORGENTHAU

THE DECADE 1946-56 has witnessed the culmination of three great revolutions which have radically transformed the political face of the world.

The political revolution destroyed the state system which since the end of the Middle Ages had maintained among a multiplicity of nations of approximately equal strength a measure of stability and order through a complicated and always precarious balance of power. Instead it brought into being a bipolar state system, with predominant power concentrated in Washington and Moscow. The colonial revolution, by sapping the strength of the formerly great European nations, contributed greatly to that bipolarization of power. That system showed at times a strong tendency to transform itself into a two-bloc system, with the two poles exerting an almost irresistible attraction upon the other nations.

The technological revolution reduced to a bare minimum the factors of time and space which in former periods of history had separated and protected the nations

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of the world from each other. Atomic power evoked the possibility both of universal destruction and of the rapid development of industrially backward countries. During this past decade, world politics has operated on two levels: the traditional one of diplomacy and conventional military force and that of atomic war used as a deterrent but not as a means to the traditional ends of foreign policy. This threat of universal atomic destruction has exerted a restraining influence upon traditional foreign policy.

On the other hand, the third revolution—the moral one—has tended to acerbate the international conflict. It has posed a dual challenge to the West in the form of international Communism and the nationalism of the former colonial and semi-colonial regions of the world. These two moral challenges have opened up a new dimension of world politics. The struggle for power in the world is being fought not only with the traditional instruments of diplomacy and the threat or use of force, but also with the weapons of propaganda, subversion and economic aid.

This new pattern of world politics has shown in the closing years of the decade traits clearly pointing toward a new transformation. All these traits—the atomic stalemate, the "new look" of Soviet policies, the disintegration of the alliances, the ferment of Asia and Africa, the rise of Germany and Japan—point in one direction: the reversal of the trend toward a two-bloc system and a new mobility in world politics which require new policies and a new outlook from the United States. This new outlook and policies are required by the probable emergence, during the next decade, of six major issues of world politics: the modification of the bipolar system through the dispersal of atomic weapons, the relationship between atomic and conventional war, the Western alliance, national Communism, the political and military vacuum in the former colonial and semi-colonial regions, and the expansion of Chinese power.

Before the new decade is over, the atomic monopoly of the United States and the Soviet Union is likely to have become a thing of the past and, with it, the mechanism of mutual deterrence which thus far has prevented an all-out atomic war and protected civilization on this planet from extinction. A number of other nations will by then have the capability perhaps not of waging all-out atomic war, but at least of blowing up some of the industrial and population centers of their neighbors and, for that matter, of the two super-powers themselves. Atomic power, monopolistically controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union and keeping each other's destructive capabilities in check, has been a force for peace, however precarious. Atomic power, haphazardly distributed among a number of nations, is bound to become a source of unprecedented insecurity, if not of panic. The constant threat of at least partial atomic destruction, under which all nations will then live, will put a premium on preventive and indiscriminately retaliatory action. Compared with the anarchy and limited violence which the end of this decade might witness, the first decade of the atomic era could appear in retrospect as a kind of golden age in which the atomic stalemate between two nations guaranteed an uneasy atomic peace and made at least for a semblance of international order.

While the long-range importance of this issue dwarfs all others, the immediate urgency of rethinking the relationship between the atomic deterrent and the traditional methods of foreign policy has been made obvious by recent events. For if the fear of all-out atomic war continues to paralyze the foreign policy of the United States while the threat of all-out atomic war gives a new impetus to that of the Soviet Union, the United States cannot help but retreat from position to position until finally it will be confronted with the choice between ignominious surrender and self-destructive atomic war.

The disintegration of the alliances on both sides of the Iron Curtain confronts the United States with two major problems that will be with us in the years ahead. How can the Western alliance be restored on the basis of a community of interests rather than that of ineffectual legal obligations and pronouncements of general intentions? And how will the United States respond constructively to the rise of national Communism behind the Iron Curtain, a development which might well be duplicated elsewhere and in unexpected places?

The trend of fashioning out of the ruins of the colonial empires new sovereign nations is likely to continue. These new nations present both a paradox and a problem. Many of them would not have been viable political, military and economic units even in the heyday of the national state. They are bound to be infinitely less so in a period of history which witnesses the obsolescence of the great national states of Europe. Not being able to stand on their own feet, they present a standing invitation to disorder and to order to be restored by an outside power. In one word, the destruction of the old colonialism is likely to call forth a new one. What new ideas and policies will the United States bring to bear upon that new contingency?

Finally, the attraction of China as a new center of power in Asia is likely to become during the ensuing decade the paramount political, military and economic fact in that part of the world. With this fact, which cannot be wished away, the United States must come to terms in one way or another. Only a real revolution in our thinking on foreign policy will enable us to rise to the challenges of the decade to come.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

Violence and the Mass Media

by Michael Maccoby

IF we clear away all the angry polemic the sermonizing, and the anecdotal evidence from *The Circle of Guilt,* we are left with a dangerous idea: that the expert's prescription for mental health should be our guide in limiting the content of movies, television, and the comics. It is an old theme of Wertham's that violence in these media seduces the child to violence on the streets. Set here in the context of a famous New York murder, Wertham's conclusions may be a lot more convincing than they should be.

The Circle of Guilt, by Frederic Wertham, MD (Rhinehart; $3).

To begin with, Frank Santana, a Puerto Rican teenager, for no apparent reason shot and killed Billy Blankenship. Wertham, engaged by Santana's lawyer, volunteered to examine the boy. He did and decided that Santana was as much a victim as was Blankenship.

It is easier by far to catch a murderer than catch the murderer's muse. This book tries to blame someone, and I think that is the trouble with it. Wertham stops just short of indicting a whole civilization. He finds as a fall guy the instructor in murder, rape, and assault—the Mass Media.

In this, Wertham seems much like the psychiatrists overwhelmed by multiple factors contributing to psychosis, who finally decide to cut out the trouble in the patient's brain. You've got to do something, says Wertham, and obviously I cannot convince you to change the whole society right away, so let's start by abolishing comic books. As with the now less-frequent pre-frontal lobotomies, the main reason for following this suggestion would be to make us all feel we were doing something big, strong, and powerful to solve a very complex problem.

When a psychiatrist investigates the factors behind a murder, he cannot prove that any of them alone are causes of crime, generally. After all, many people are provoked; many are products of fatherless homes; many spend hours with mass produced violent fantasy. And of these, not everyone commits murder. For all we know, legislating such recreation as the comics out of existence might be like slicing a head off the Hydra. What seduces some to crime may be a pressure valve for others.

Wertham does not believe the aggressive and often gory material he has met in such extreme conditions can be good for anyone. He argues that children read and watch these shadows only because there is nothing else to see or do. A steady over-balanced diet leaves a craving, which is often satisfied by vicarious violence and, sometimes, by the do-it-yourself type. In other words, these kids would watch Doris Day as soon as see the terror of the plains if they had the choice.

But can one blame the newspaper if a reader imitates crime news? Perhaps, one might say it has civilized the *disturbed* enough to place a switchblade into bare fists. I cannot prove that violent fiction works this way, but it has seemed so from my experience with children. From the time they begin as media consumers, only the least controlled read about violence, much less enjoy it. Inhibited, guilt-ridden children never touch the stuff. In fact, some of them refuse to read anything at all about people; their limit is the humanoid world of Disney.

Even Dennis the Menace scares some children. (At the other extremes, one little troublemaker announced that he and his friends read Dennis because the comic gives them good ideas for things to do. Evidently, the fear of these ideas

Portrait in Winter

THERE is much to be said for the portrait painted in winter,
Winter of age, and winter of season.
Light from snow clouds is no sharper
Than sun of Spring. It is clearer.
Colors hold their right, shapes define their reason,
Values are neither increased nor changed.

Time's winter has marked brow and hair,
Iced a thin nose, cupped the eyes,
Chiseled a final story on the mouth,
No longer curved in wonder or surprise.
Winter is too late to alter what is there.

Within the room warmth from the hearth glows
Against fuchsia dress. Under a chair
The black dog sighs contentedly.
Against a northern window barbed sleet blows.

And the painter, moving in a sinuate pattern,
Mixes thought and color, line and perception.
His brush a sharp dissecting instrument
Bears down against bone, or delicately
Finds a secret pulse. From chromatic palette
He builds flesh and weight; movement
Poised, at rest; form dominated
By the mind's perspective.
Ambience of the past discarded—
Soft air of summer, or the appled autumns—
In disembodied light of winter
He paints a portrait for a candid future.

KATHERINE GARRISON CHAPIN

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do not overwhelm the impulse to carry them out.) Some of these children see themselves not as would-be spacemen or gun-toters, rather more as Donald Ducks —trying to strike back at a frustrating world, more often landing on their behinds for the effort. I have a hunch that those children who prefer Donald's nephews—Huey, Dewey, and Louie—will turn out to be more openly aggressive than those who make Donald their hero.

Like Wertham, in this I am trying to amend Freud's (and Aristotle's) suggestion that fantasy of action substitutes for the act itself. Those who enjoy violent fantasy the most, often are the most violent. But here is the difference. While packaged violence may teach the uninhibited to commit more sophisticated crime, there are those who get some kind of cathartic kick out of identifying with the Humphrey Bogarts (I do myself). After all, some of us who seldom see movies seek out just these thrillers. Perhaps the criminal gets some release from his tensions too, but later when the impulse is there, and no movie theater at hand, the wish leads to crime.

Is the reaction of a few cause enough for censorship? In any case, I do not think the decision is up to the psychological investigator. The content of television, movies, and comics—like hard liquor and fissionable material—may, at times, produce anti-social blasts. But in the end, the majority in a democratic society must decide how to handle its monsters. The most the scientist can do is to give us all a better picture of what we are letting ourselves in for when we decide by law to limit our free choice as consumers.

President Wilson's New Deal

by Gerald W. Johnson

LINK improves as he goes along; this second volume of his monumental life of Woodrow Wilson is definitely better than the first. The improvement is not in the style, which was excellent from the beginning, nor in the scholarship, which is, if anything, too meticulous (if the footnotes in this volume were not reduced to six-point type they would occupy about as much space as the text). It is a subtler thing—a firmer grip, an increase in the sense of mastery of the subject that cannot be isolated in any one passage, but that is perceptible throughout the book, and adds materially to the impression it makes upon the reader.

Wilson: The New Freedom, by Arthur S. Link (Princeton; $7.50).

This volume deals with a phase of Wilson's career that was almost completely obscured by the dust and smoke of the first World War, and that lay fallow for a long time afterward, but that became tremendously important 20 years later when it appeared as the intellectual foundation of the second Roosevelt's New Deal.

Link's most important contribution in this volume is the clarity of his demonstration that Wilson was a reformer, not a radical. When someone (Freidel, perhaps?) has made this equally clear as regards F. D. Roosevelt, we shall begin to get something like a true perspective on the two men which will give us, possibly, a more just appreciation of what actually happened to this country between 1912 and 1945. There is not the shadow of a doubt that it was a portentous generation, but exactly what it portended remains in doubt.

The weakness of Link's work is, curiously enough, at the same time one source of its strength. It is a certain narrowness of view, not uncommon in academic specialists, that enables him to cut through the fog of sentimentality and superstition that always surrounds an important public figure, to reach the hard fact. This is strength. But the same quality tends to betray the biographer into concentrating on fact, sometimes to loss of essential truth.

This shows up clearly in Link's treatment of one of the most important episodes in the book, Wilson's method of dealing with the Mexican military adventurer, Victoriano Huerta. Wilson, says Link, took too high a moral tone in that affair and his diplomacy as a result was futile and at times fatuous. It must be conceded that this is factually correct, but that it is the whole truth will be strenuously denied in many quarters.

THE really significant outcome of the Huerta business was not the elimination of one ruffian from Mexican public life, but the fact that his backers lost millions. Wilson's moral indignation was expensive to pious gentry in New York, London and Paris, who never dipped their own hands in Mexican blood, but hired murderous thugs to do it for them. Link admits that Huerta was gaining substantial financial support and seemed in a fair way to crush all opposition when Wilson intervened. If Huerta had done so, does anyone believe that Mexico would have made the astonishing progress she has made in the past 40 years? If the Wilsonian diplomacy of morality resulted, even indirectly, in the liberation of the Mexican people, it was in the long run neither futile nor fatuous.

Of course Wilson had no effect on Huerta and his like; but in making the backing of such characters financially unprofitable he had a profound effect on those foreigners who had been accustomed to supply the sinews of war to the banditti.

The domestic policies of the New Freedom, argues Link, were based on the theory that equal justice under law is the summation of good government; and that, he points out, was certainly nothing new, radical, or even conspicuously liberal. Alexander Hamilton accepted it as readily as Thomas Jefferson. Exactly; but such men as Wilson and the second Roosevelt gained a reputation for radicalism by insisting that justice must be substantial, not merely legalistic. The introduction of that idea by Wilson was his great contribution; and whether he demanded substantial justice because God approved it, or because Wilson approved it, or even if he could not easily differentiate the two is of small practical importance, fascinating as it must be to psychologists and artists.

The Link biography, in short, should, like any other work of major importance, be read with a lively skepticism. But that it is of major importance is no longer a question; and its grace, added to its learning, makes it an ornament of American scholarship.

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A Rabbi's Parables

by Will Herberg

THE HASIDIC movement, which emerged in eastern Europe toward the middle of the 18th Century, was, as Martin Buber cogently points out, the "last intensive effort in modern history to rejuvenate a religion." It came into being to provide the Jewish masses with an alternative between a demoralizing pseudo-messianism on the one side, and a graceless rabbinic scholasticism on the other. The masses of East European Jewry were still suffering from the profound depression that had set in with the catastrophic collapse of the Sabbatian movement, and there was apparently nothing for them in the dessicated formalism of the official Talmudic sophocracy. To them Hasidism came with an evangelical message of spiritual immediacy, joy in the Lord, true community, and the hallowing of the everyday.

The Tales of Rabbi Nachman, by Martin Buber. Translated from the German by Maurice Friedman (Horizon; $3.50).

The Hasidic movement, as it was developed by its founder, the Baal Shem Tob (Master of the Good Name), and his near disciples, drew upon the long tradition of Jewish mysticism, which it transformed from an esoteric gnosis into a great source of popular spirituality—the "opening of the mystery" is what Buber has called it. Like all creative religious movements, it was a lower-class enterprise, with strong overtones of economic and social protest. Like all such movements too, it soon degenerated, becoming a prey to corruptions of its own, in many cases considerably worse than those it had risen against. But the heritage it left behind it never quite lost its authentic character; in one form or another, Hasidism put its mark on every significant movement of Jewish spirituality into our time.

Almost from the very beginning, it seems, two diverse, even antithetic trends could be distinguished in the Hasidic tradition — "mystical, contemplative piety" and the "piety of faith." These terms are from J. G. Weiss, who explains:

> There is a dichotomy of direction [in Hasidism] which finds expression in two systems — one is that of a mystical, contemplative type with an idealistic and semi-pantheistic outlook; the other is that of the piety of faith, which lives in an atmosphere of "existentialism."

This latter trend is associated with Rabbi Nachman of Bratzlav.

Rabbi Nachman, as was the custom of the Hasidic *rebbe,* taught by tales, a form of "indirect communication." He did so with consummate skill. Indeed, according to Buber, he was the "first real storyteller among the Jews," the "creator of a literary genre, the symbolical fairy tale." Some 50 years ago, Buber himself published in German a small book in which he "recreated"—"not translated, but retold with full freedom" —some of these tales, which have come down to us in confused form in the notes of disciples. This volume has now appeared in English. It consists of some 20 of Nachman's sayings and six of his longer tales, to which are added by way of introduction a chapter on "Rabbi Nachman and Jewish Mysticism," and by way of conclusion another on "Rabbi Nachman's Journey to the Holy Land."

The sayings and tales in this volume bear witness to the complexity of Rabbi Nachman's thought and to the depth of his spirituality. The basic themes of religious existentialism emerge at many points. Rabbi Nachman's Hasidism is indeed a "piety of faith." "Faith is an immensely strong thing," he says, "and through faith and simplicity . . . one becomes worthy of attaining the rung of grace. . . . " He sees men placed at every moment of life in the crisis of decision, on which everything depends: "The world was created only for the sake of the choice and the choosing one." Holiness is "strength of being," and the discipline of holiness is the intensification of the will oriented to God.

We even find in Nachman what seems an anticipation of Gabriel Marcel's celebrated antithesis between being and having. "For wherever man adheres to being something or doing something," the Master of Prayer teaches

> . . . there his roots remain in the human, and out of his roots he can become whole. . . . But when man adheres to the delusion of possessing something, there he tears his roots out of the human; they no longer draw up healing to him. . . .

One cannot help wishing there were more of these sayings and tales in this volume. But even stronger is the wish that someone with the scholarly competence and the religio-philosophical understanding would undertake the task of presenting a full-scale study of this great Hasidic thinker.

Notes on Contributors

MICHAEL MACCOBY is doing research on children with learning difficulties. KATHERINE GARRISON CHAPIN's latest collection of poems is *Plain Chant for America.* WILL HERBERG's newest book is *Protestant-Catholic-Jew.* MAXWELL GEISMAR is the author of *Rebels and Ancestors.*

Cancer?
The American Cancer Society says that too many people die of it, NEEDLESSLY: That's why I have an annual medical checkup however well I feel. I know the seven danger signals. And when I want sound information, I get it from my Unit of the
AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY

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MAXWELL GEISMAR . . . . . *Gullible Humanity*

THE manuscript of *Gulliver's Travels* was delivered at night to a Fleet Street printer, and published anonymously in 1726. It was considered dangerous to print, not so much for its uninhibited language as for its barely hidden political satire. This method of publication was also typical of its author, who continually played a double game of secrecy and revelation, often to his own undoing. Swift's allegory became famous directly, while later ages have continued to find different levels of meanings in the narrative.

There is first the social and topical description of the Augustan Age, on the level of what Swift consciously thought he was doing. Thus, among the political "keys" to the story, the High-Heels and Low-Heels in Lilliput are the Tories and Whigs under George I. The imperial prince who hobbles along on heels of different sizes is the future George II. The enemy power of Blefuscu, whose navy Gulliver tows away, is France—which Marlborough had brought to its knees, with which Bolingbroke had concluded the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, and for which he, like Gulliver, was accused of treasonable intercourse with foreign agents.

The Big-Endians in the famous egg controversy were the Roman Catholics who supported the Stuart Kings. The Little-Endians were the Protestants who brought in the tolerant but obtuse Hanoverians. But the great prophet Lustrog, whose fundamental doctrine—"That all true believers shall break their eggs at the convenient end"—was used by both sides in the war, was Swift's own creation. He himself had taken an active part in the violent factional struggles which, while convulsing England, had still marked the rise of the parliamentary power; the dominance of the civilian over the military; and the end of the divine-right monarchs who had sometimes yielded their heads along with their privileges.

Thus, too, in the third voyage of the narrative, the Flying or Floating Island which blankets Balnibarbi was intended to represent England, which had "integrated" Ireland only to exploit it. But Swift had reached such a point of melancholy that he could ridicule his own deepest convictions with a desperate and impartial irony. If Gulliver was first described as a beneficent giant among a race of tiny mortals, he is suddenly transposed to a helpless manikin in a universe of horrid monsters. The inner structure of the *Travels* moves from the political and social sphere of man's existence to the natural and biological bases of life; and the "Voyage to Brobdingnag" is a fable of endless frustration.

GULLIVER, now infinitesimally tiny, is placed on the same handkerchief on which he had paraded the armies of Lilliput. He is molested by gigantic cats and fierce rats; retrieved by a dog; persecuted by a dwarf. He examines the huge lice on the beggars of Brobdingnag; is knocked over by hailstones; battles with flies. The Maids of Honour at the court strip him naked and sport with him on their monstrous breasts — or worse—while he swoons under their perfume. A frog leaps across his body to smear him with "its odious slime." A pet monkey kidnaps him and, high, high, on the ridges and eaves of the imperial palace, stuffs his mouth with filthy food, taken from its jowls. Under the mode of comedy, and described with a monumental innocence, this voyage is surely the most brilliant evocation in our letters of not merely the Freudian, but, as it were, the Darwinian nightmare.

But was the race of mortals ever quite so victimized as Swift described it here? Is it purely the hapless prey and sport and dupe of natural forces so infinitely beyond its ken? Poor gullible humanity, was it born merely to be tortured—not only in the nursery (from which so many of these visions came) but in those long vistas of primitive prehistory from which Swift, like Jack London, seemed to draw his instances of mockery and impotence? We know that directly before finishing the *Travels,* Swift had been dismissed by Vanessa, the one woman who was able to break through his deep resistances to, and odd notions of, a mature relationship between the sexes.

There was no doubt anyway that *she* cherished him; and, as her eloquent and touching letters reveal, she had refused to be satisfied by the immaculate apprenticeship into which he forced the obedient if inscrutable Stella. Vanessa was a gallant woman; and Swift yielded to her charms—very far for him perhaps. And when he was abandoned by her, and when he saw where all his extravagant hopes for political power and worldly state had led him—to this barbaric exile among "the savage old Irish"—he fell back upon the whole curious cluster of his infantile phobias about women, love and life. Much of the scattered voyage in the *Travels* was written before this point; but in the fourth and final section of the book, the celebrated "voyage to the Houyhnhnms," Swift's despair reached its climax.

"Upon the whole, I never beheld in all my travels so disagreeable an animal, or one against which I naturally conceived so strong an antipathy," says Gulliver about the Yahoos. If Swift had moved from a radical critique of social institutions to the demons and ogres who surrounded—in his fancy—the infancy of man, now he wished to obliterate the human race itself. This cursed tribe indeed—with its deformed bodies and mischievous minds, its fondness for avarice and stealth, its strange disposition to nastiness and dirt, its debasement of reason and common sense, so that it appeared only to be "cunning, malicious, treacherous, and revengeful . . . insolent, abject, and cruel." The young Yahoos are "odious vermin" to Swift's voyage; the older ones, like the Struldbrugs of Luggnagg (in Swift's baby-talk language), are examples of hideous senility.

UPON his return to England, Gulliver faints at his wife's kiss; eats his food alone; stuffs his nose with rue or tobacco to avoid the smell of "that odious animal" man. In much the same way Swift spent the later years of his own life, until the madness which he had always feared finally descended fully upon him.

But in the meantime, what blows he had struck for the Yahoos he despised, and what laughter was mingled with his anger! And what a lovely prose he had fashioned to express the exuberance of a wild imagination under the guise of "fact." His great work done, he could afford to sit silent in an empty room.

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Correspondence

(*Continued from page 3*)

and analysis of America's vital interests. . . . It comes as a surprise indeed to read the bill of indictments against the present Administration by Mr. Morgenthau. For the past ten years the foreign policy of the United States has been almost completely dominated by the *Politik real* school of which he is a leading exponent. Naked force and propaganda are the essential, if not the only, ingredients of this concept of diplomacy. In spite of the fact that this two-legged stool of brute force and deliberate deception of propaganda has brought nothing but death, disaster and destruction to Europe and much of the rest of the world for more than a century, the proponents of this school enjoy increasing power and prestige in the United States. Even the nightmare of fission and fusion has not awakened the West to the complete bankruptcy of this philosophy. The fear is real all right, but the hope is encouraged that "we can drop it first."

Any competent student of history can assemble an equal or even more impressive array of sophistries than Mr. Morgenthau has in his series of articles, in support of the acts of Hitler because of Germany's supposed "vital" interests, and the "vital" interests of the great colonial powers of the 19th and early 20th Centuries. What he condemns the present Administration for not doing in the Suez crisis, the governments of England, Germany, France and Russia did or tried to do before 1914, and their predecessors for a century before that. Few competent students indeed would now claim that the leaders of Russia, if I may use one of Mr. Morgenthau's illustrations, served her "vital" interests by war with Finland in 1939. That they thought they were doing so no one can seriously doubt, but the mortal danger lies in the possible error of judgment, the absence of a reliable yardstick of values . . .

According to reports emanating from Washington through the "insiders" the United States is going to take over in the Middle East by force, if necessary, in order to evict Russia and keep her out permanently. No suggestion of negotiating an agreement to develop the area in the interest of its people and of peace. If this proves true, we have not only muffed another excellent opportunity for negotiating a general peace, but we have passed another crossroad in our headlong race toward war. If there is no alternative to peace, there can be no substitute for cooperation in international relations. Failure to observe the significance of this corollary means W.W. III becomes as inevitable as the sunrise.

HUGH B. ESTER
Brigadier General, USA (Ret.)
Philadelphia, Pa.

The New Republic welcomes communications from its readers in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less lend themselves to publication more readily than longer letters.

" . . . the best analysis"

THE two articles [by Hans Morgenthau] are perhaps the best analysis of recent events that I have read, and in depth of analysis far superior to what one usually finds in a debate on foreign policy. You ought to be complimented for printing this.

HENRY A. KISSINGER
Harvard University

" . . . jugular points"

I THINK that in many places Dr. Morgenthau hits at truly jugular points which have not been mentioned by other commentators on foreign policy. He is the first writer I have read who tries to explain *why* American foreign policy has got itself into its present state of affairs. This I regard as an especially valuable contribution. I do not think, though, that he covers this point completely. I would like to see an article by him, and by others, exploring further the question of *why*.

There are many things I do not agree with. For example, his arguments about aggression and the points which you picked up in your editorial.

THOMAS K. FINLETTER
New York, New York

► *Ataraxes in the Attic*

SIRS:

I AM glad Mr. L. A. Jensen called me to task on the statement in my article "Beware Ataraxes in the Attic": "The answer to mental illness can never be biochemical, pharmacological or physiological."

While I appreciate that the statement sounds dogmatic I am not sure it is unscientific. Mental illness is not a thing like cancer is a thing. It is the interpretation of observable behavior and implies a personal and cultural bias on the part of the observer. "We generally think of somebody as mentally ill to the extent we are unable to understand them." Obviously if mental symptoms are changed by drugs it is possible that our concept of what constitutes mental illness may change. Even if the drugs could produce for the world a state of benighted apathy much as Huxley described in the *Brave New World,* who is to say that a man from Mars might not look down and remark: "Man, they're crazy."

DON D. JACKSON, MD
Palo Alto, California

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